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Should federal courts police partisan gerrymandering? This question has lurked in 
the background of voting rights cases ever since the Supreme Court first waded into the 
political thicket in Baker v Carr.1 For nearly two decades the Court has been explicitly 
divided over the answer to the question, and commentators have been similarly split. 
Despite these deep divides, however, both courts and commentators are united on one 
point—that congressional gerrymanders and state legislative gerrymanders should be 
treated identically by courts. Both constitutional jurisprudence and legal scholarship have 
uniformly assumed that these two types of gerrymanders pose the same problems and are 
subject to the same solutions. 
This past Term the Supreme Court entrenched this assumption in constitutional 
doctrine when it decided Vieth v Jubelirer.2 Vieth, a partisan gerrymandering case from 
Pennsylvania, represented the Court’s first crack at resolving the question whether federal 
courts should police partisan gerrymandering since a fractured Court said “yes” eighteen 
years ago in Davis v Bandemer.3 The Court treated Vieth as a referendum on Bandemer. 
And over the disagreement of four justices, it reaffirmed Bandemer’s basic holding that 
federal constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering are justiciable.4 In a strange 
omission, however, not one of the five opinions in Vieth mentioned a central distinction 
between Bandemer and Vieth—that the former concerned a challenge to state legislative 
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1 369 US 186 (1962). 
2 124 S Ct 1769 (2004). 
3 478 US 109 (1986). 
4 Justice Scalia, announcing the judgment of the Court dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims, argued for a 
plurality that Bandemer should be overturned. See Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1792 (plurality). But five members of 
the Court refused to overrule Bandemer’s justiciability holding. See id at 1795 (Kennedy concurring); id at 
1799 (Stevens dissenting); id at 1815 (Souter, joined by Ginsburg, dissenting); id at 1822 (Breyer 
dissenting). 
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districting, while the latter involved a challenge to congressional districts.5 No justice 
questioned whether this difference had any normative or constitutional significance. Nor 
has any commentator. 
This article challenges the conventional view that federal congressional and state 
legislative political gerrymanders are functional equivalents.6 To the contrary, these two 
types of gerrymanders raise quite distinct conceptual, normative, and constitutional 
questions. The differences make clear that the Court was wrong to treat Vieth as a 
referendum on Bandemer. Moreover, these differences create unique—and 
unrecognized—challenges for courts trying to police partisan gerrymandering in the 
federal congressional context. 
Part I elaborates the analytic difference between state and congressional 
redistricting and shows that the courts and commentators have been inattentive to this 
basic conceptual point. When a court evaluates a gerrymandered state legislative 
districting plan, it can assess the districting plan that helps determine the composition of 
the entire state legislature. For this reason, the court can locate the harm of the partisan 
gerrymander at the institutional level of the state legislature itself.7 In contrast, when a 
court evaluates a single state’s congressional districting plan, the most that the court can 
conclude is that the state’s congressional delegation has been manipulated in favor of one 
political party or the other. In other words, evaluating the potential political gerrymander 
of a single congressional districting plan in isolation prevents a court from identifying the 
harms, if any, that stem from the manipulation of the composition of Congress as a 
whole. Instead, the harm must be located at the institutional level of the state 
congressional delegation or individual congressional districts.8 
                                                 
5 Compare Bandemer, 478 US at 113, with Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1773. 
6 Throughout this article, I use “congressional” to refer only to the national legislature. For that reason, 
I often will not explicitly note that congressional districts are “federal.” 
7 This is exactly how the Supreme Court framed its inquiry in Bandemer; it evaluated the state 
legislative districting plan from a statewide perspective, rather than attempting to locate district-specific 
injuries. See Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 127 (1986) (noting that the claim “made by the appellees is . . 
. that the apportionment discriminates against Democrats on a statewide basis,” and stating that “although 
the statewide discrimination asserted here was allegedly accomplished through the manipulation of 
individual district lines, the focus of the equal protection inquiry is necessarily somewhat different from 
that involved in the review of individual districts”). 
8 In Vieth, the plaintiffs asserted that the injury of congressional gerrymandering stemmed from 
Pennsylvania’s drawing districts that biased the state’s congressional delegation in favor of the Republican 
party. Even if Democrats won a majority of the statewide vote, the plaintiffs alleged, they would win only a 
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Part II explains that this feature of congressional redistricting poses a problem 
because the conventional arguments about why partisan gerrymanders are harmful 
generally describe harms that turn on the structure of representation in Congress as a 
whole—not on the consequences of redistricting for a small subset of seats within 
Congress. For this reason, judicial review that focuses only on a single state’s 
redistricting plan cannot hope to identify the presence of these injuries. Moreover, as Part 
III shows, alternative theories of partisan gerrymandering’s harm are unlikely to solve 
this problem. The alternatives also generally focus on Congress as a whole. And while 
expressive harms or purpose-based theories of injury (and perhaps other theories that are 
completely disconnected from the actual electoral consequences of redistricting) could 
escape this nationwide institutional perspective, such theories would cut deep against the 
grain of the Court’s longstanding and correct recognition of the inevitable role that 
partisan advantage-seeking plays in redistricting. In short, therefore, the way in which 
federal courts review congressional partisan gerrymandering claims today—examining 
individual states’ redistricting plans in isolation—makes it impossible for courts to 
identify the presence or absence of the harms commonly thought to flow from partisan 
gerrymanders. 
Part IV asks what this shortcoming of contemporary judicial review means for the 
capacity of courts to curtail the ills of congressional partisan gerrymanders. With respect 
to Vieth itself, the analytic structure of congressional gerrymanders shows that the 
approaches to policing partisan gerrymandering advocated by individual justices in the 
case miss the mark. If the harms of congressional partisan gerrymanders can be identified 
only by reference to Congress as a whole, the efforts by members of the Court to identify 
such harms within the current delegation-centric structure of judicial review are doomed 
to fail. This leaves courts with three options: they can restructure judicial review so that 
courts can evaluate the combined consequences of every state’s congressional 
redistricting; they can abandon any effort to directly identify the existence of harms 
caused by congressional partisan gerrymanders and instead develop prophylactic rules 
that reduce the risk that state redistricting efforts will together produce a nationwide 
                                                                                                                                                 
minority of the state’s congressional seats. It was this delegation-level bias, they argued, that violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
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harm; or they can give up on policing partisan gerrymanders in the context of 
congressional redistricting. 
Various coordination problems among the states and within the judiciary make the 
first option implausible as a practical matter. The second option is theoretically attractive: 
judicial intervention at the state level can reduce the risk of congress-wide injuries. 
Theoretical niceties aside, however, the practical attractiveness of this option depends on 
the answers to under-explored questions—such as how likely it is that the effects of 
individual states’ redistricting plans accumulate to produce congressional-level harms. 
And if judicial intervention is warranted, the disaggregated nature of congressional 
redistricting affects how courts should structure state-level review and calls into question 
some popular proposals for jurisprudential reform. 
I. THE DISAGGREGATED NATURE OF CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 
Congressional and state legislative gerrymanders raise quite distinct analytic, 
normative, and constitutional questions. But both courts and legal commentators have 
largely overlooked this point, typically analyzing state and congressional redistricting in 
the same fashion. This oversight is perhaps understandable: the process of congressional 
and state legislative redistricting is facially identical in most states, and this similarity 
makes it easy to miss a critical structural distinction between the two—that state 
legislative redistricting plans affect the composition of the entire legislature, while 
congressional redistricting plans affect the composition of only a subpart of the 
legislature. As the following Parts will show, however, this difference has substantial 
implications for the theory and practice of judicial oversight of partisan redistricting. 
In order to identify the important analytic difference between state legislative and 
congressional redistricting, it is necessary first to understand the way in which these types 
of redistricting are very much the same. In both instances, the state government has initial 
authority to draw the boundaries for all of the legislative districts in the state.9 With 
                                                 
9 While the focus of this article is on districted elections, it is important to note that legislative 
representatives can be selected through a number of different mechanisms. These mechanisms differ in 
many dimensions: in whether voters cast ballots for parties or candidates; in how many votes are allotted to 
each voter; in how votes are aggregated to determine a winner; and so on. See Gary Cox, Making Votes 
Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral System (Cambridge 1997). Despite the existence of 
myriad possibilities, the single-member district plurality voting election structure is by far the most 
common in the United States. Federal law requires that it be used for all congressional elections, see note 
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respect to state legislative districts, the state’s authority to draw district lines is inherent 
in state sovereignty and reserved in the federal Constitution. (The authority is, of course, 
subject to numerous federal constitutional and statutory constraints.) States obviously do 
not have inherent sovereign authority to fashion federal congressional districts,10 but 
Article I, Section IV of the Constitution delegates this authority initially to states. That 
Clause, typically referred to as the Elections Clause, provides that “[t]he Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or 
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”11 The Supreme 
Court has consistently interpreted the Clause as conferring congressional districting 
authority on states.12 And while the Clause gives Congress the power to supersede state 
regulations of congressional elections, Congress has not used this power to divest states 
of redistricting authority.13 
Thus, the process for state legislative and federal congressional redistricting is 
superficially identical in many respects. In each instance the state—typically through its 
ordinary legislative process—carves up the state’s territory into a number of districts 
sufficient to select the total number of representatives to be elected statewide. But this 
sameness of process disguises an important difference: in the state legislative context, the 
state is drawing district lines for the entire legislative assembly; in the congressional 
context, however, the state is drawing district lines for only its own congressional 
                                                                                                                                                 
13, and nearly every state uses this election structure (or a close variant) for state legislative elections as 
well. 
10 Consider United State Term Limits, Inc v Thornton, 514 US 779 (1995). 
11 US Const Art I, § 4. 
12 See, for example, Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 33–35 (1993). See also Adam B. Cox, Partisan 
Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 NYU L Rev 751, 791 & n 148 (2004). Founding-era history also 
supports the conclusion that the Election Clause’s initial grant of authority to states includes the power to 
regulate redistricting. See id at 790. 
13 Congress has used this power to require that states elect their congressional representatives from 
single member districts. See 2 USC § 2c (“In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any 
subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to 
the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to 
the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only 
from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative . . . .”). See generally Branch 
v Smith, 538 US 252 (2003) (discussing 2 USC § 2c). Congress first enacted the single-member district 
requirement in 1842. See Act of June 25, 1842, § 2 , 5 Stat 491 (corresponding to 2 USC §§ 2a-2c). The 
requirement was later dropped and reinstated, and at one time included an additional requirement that 
congressional districts be equipopulous. See Cox, 79 NYU L Rev at 794 n 162 (cited in note 12). 
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delegation—that is, for only a subpart of Congress as a whole. Another way to put this is 
that the process for redistricting each state legislature is consolidated, while the process 
for redistricting Congress is disaggregated. 
The disaggregated nature of congressional redistricting fundamentally alters the 
analytic structure of judicial review of congressional partisan gerrymandering claims.14 
When a court evaluates a claim that a state legislative districting plan constitutes an 
impermissible partisan gerrymander, it is assessing the districting plan that helps 
determine the composition of the entire state legislature. For this reason, the court can 
locate the harm of the partisan gerrymander at the institutional level of the state 
legislature itself. Or, to put it slightly differently, the court can adopt a systemwide 
account of the harm caused by the partisan gerrymander. When a court evaluates a single 
state’s congressional districting plan, however, the most that the court can conclude is 
that the state’s congressional delegation has been manipulated for partisan ends.15 In 
other words, evaluating the potential political gerrymander of a single congressional 
districting plan in isolation prevents a court from identifying harms that stem from the 
manipulation of the composition of Congress as a whole. Instead, the harm must be 
located at the institutional level of the state congressional delegation or some lower level. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s existing partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence, 
one would have expected the Court to have noticed this crucial distinction in the Vieth 
litigation. Prior to Vieth, the Supreme Court had adjudicated a partisan gerrymandering 
claim on only one occasion—in Davis v Bandemer.16 Bandemer concerned a state 
legislative redistricting plan; the plaintiffs in that case alleged that Indiana’s state 
                                                 
14 The focus in this article is exclusively on partisan gerrymandering, but the article’s analysis is 
relevant to other types of gerrymandering claims as well. 
15 As I explain later, there are several ways in which district lines might be manipulated for partisan 
ends. They might be manipulated to bias the composition of the delegation in favor of one political party or 
the other, to reduce the competitiveness of seats held by either party, or in some other fashion. 
16 478 US 109 (1986). The Court had summarily affirmed a number of other partisan gerrymandering 
cases that came to the Court on direct (rather than certiorari) review, but Bandemer was the Court’s only 
previous partisan gerrymandering opinion. In Bandemer the Court had held that partisan gerrymandering 
claims were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 127. But the Court set forth such an 
exceedingly stringent (or maybe even incoherent) standard for demonstrating unconstitutionality that no 
partisan gerrymandering claims brought since Bandemer had been successful. See Cox, 79 NYU L Rev at 
796–98 (cited in note 12). Consider also Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The 
Law of Democracy 866 (rev 2d ed 2002). 
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legislative redistricting scheme constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.17 
To evaluate the claim, the plurality opinion in Bandemer examined the effect of the 
redistricting plan on the structure of representation in the entire legislature.18 It was at the 
institutional level of the legislature as a whole, rather than at some lower institutional 
level such as individual districts, that the plurality sought to identify the injury of partisan 
gerrymandering. In contrast to Bandemer, Vieth concerned an alleged congressional 
partisan gerrymander; the Vieth plaintiffs alleged that the congressional districts drawn in 
Pennsylvania following the 2000 census were politically gerrymandered.19 Because the 
case concerned an alleged congressional partisan gerrymander, the Vieth Court was 
precluded from adopting the analytic perspective that the plurality had applied in 
Bandemer—it did not have the option of identifying the harm of partisan gerrymandering 
at the institutional level of the legislative assembly. 
Surprisingly, none of the opinions in Vieth mention this fact or appear to recognize 
that Bandemer might pose different questions than does Vieth.20 The Court split five ways 
in Vieth. Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Scalia concluded that Bandemer’s 
justiciability holding had been in error; claims of partisan gerrymandering, he wrote, 
present nonjusticiable political questions.21 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment 
upholding the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims, but he did not agree with the plurality 
that partisan gerrymandering claims should be nonjusticiable.22 Justices Breyer, 
                                                 
17 Bandemer, 478 US at 115. 
18 See id at 127 (noting that the claim “made by the appellees is . . . that the apportionment 
discriminates against Democrats on a statewide basis,” and stating that “although the statewide 
discrimination asserted here was allegedly accomplished through the manipulation of individual district 
lines, the focus of the equal protection inquiry is necessarily somewhat different from that involved in the 
review of individual districts”). 
19 Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1773. Vieth arose out of Pennsylvania’s congressional redistricting following the 
2000 census. Republicans controlled the state’s redistricting process and produced a district map that, 
according to Democrats’ claims, ensured Republicans would capture a supermajority of the congressional 
seats even if the party captured only a minority of the statewide congressional votes. See Brief for 
Appellants, Vieth v Jubelirer, No. 02-1580, *2 (filed Aug 29, 2003) (available on Lexis at 2002 US Briefs 
1580). Democrats sued in federal court, contending that the redistricting scheme violated the Constitution. 
See Vieth v Pennsylvania, 188 F Supp 2d 532 (MD Pa 2002); Vieth v Pennsylvania, 241 F Supp 2d 478 
(MD Pa 2003). 
20 Nor, perhaps surprisingly, did the litigants (in particular, the defendants) bring up this potentially 
important distinction between the two cases. 
21 Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1778. 
22 Id at 1793 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment). Instead, Kennedy concluded (somewhat bizarrely) 
that the plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because he could not think of a workable standard for 
evaluating their partisan gerrymandering claim. See id at 1796–97. He expressed hope that such a standard 
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Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter dissented in three opinions, each opinion concluding that 
the district court was wrong to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims—and each opinion 
suggesting a different test for identifying the existence of an impermissibly harmful 
partisan gerrymander.23 Despite the extremely fractured nature of the Court’s decision, 
the justices were in agreement on one score: each saw Vieth as a referendum on the 
Court’s earlier decision in Bandemer. None of the justices appears to have thought that 
there would be any reason to treat the partisan gerrymandering claim leveled against the 
state legislative plan in Bandemer differently than the claim leveled against the 
congressional redistricting at issue in Vieth.24 
Largely without discussion, the justices in Vieth simply adopted either a delegation- 
or district-specific perspective of the harm caused by partisan gerrymanders.25 Only 
Justice Kennedy hinted at the possibility of a legislature-wide perspective. Near the close 
of his opinion, he suggested that it may be misleading to try to identify impermissibly 
“excessive” partisan gerrymanders by focusing on each state delegation in isolation. As 
                                                                                                                                                 
would eventually be found, and it was this optimism that led him to conclude that is was too soon to hold 
partisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. Id at 1794–96. As Justice Scalia pointed out, however, it is 
a bit difficult to see how Justice Kennedy’s conclusion about the current absence of an administrable 
standard is much different than a finding of current nonjusticiability. Id at 1792 (plurality). And if they are 
different, it is tough to see why a plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed simply because the court cannot 
decide on the appropriate standard for evaluating the plaintiff’s claim. 
23 Justice Stevens drew on the Shaw v Reno line of racial redistricting cases to develop his proposed 
test. He argued that legislative purpose should be the touchstone of the partisan gerrymandering inquiry: a 
legislative district has been unconstitutionally politically gerrymandered, he concluded, if partisanship was 
the predominant motive for the design of the district. See id at 1808–13 (Stevens dissenting). Justice Souter 
drew on Title VII and Voting Rights Act litigation to construct his favored inquiry, arguing that the concept 
of vote dilution should guide courts in partisan gerrymandering cases. See id at 1817–19 (Souter 
dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence should focus on preventing 
unjustified minority entrenchment. See id at 1825–27 (Breyer dissenting).  
24 See Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1773 (plurality) (framing the question as “whether our decision in Bandemer 
was in error,” without acknowledging that Bandemer might be importantly different than Vieth); id at 6 
(Kennedy concurring) (treating Bandemer as posing the same justiciability question as Vieth). This 
oversight is perhaps more understandable for some justices than others. Justice Stevens, for example, 
clearly adopted a district-centric purpose analysis for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims. Because 
he chose to locate the injury of partisan gerrymandering at the district level, it made sense to treat 
congressional and state legislative districting as posing the same question. But even Justice Stevens 
apparently saw state-level analysis the only alternative to his district-centric perspective; he too omitted the 
possibility of adopting a legislature-wide perspective. See Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1779–80, 1805–07 (Stevens 
dissenting). 
25 See Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1828–29 (Breyer dissenting) (adopting a statewide perspective); id at 1817 
(Souter dissenting) (suggesting that a statewide perspective is important but focusing first on individual 
districts); id at 1799, 1805 (Stevens dissenting) (adopting a district-level perspective). Justice Stevens goes 
so far as to suggest that the Court’s racial gerrymandering jurisprudence overruled Bandemer’s statewide 
focus and required that all questions of fairness in redistricting be resolved at the district level—whether 
racial, political, or some other sort of fairness is at issue. Id at 1805. 
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an illustration, he described the cumulative effect of several hypothetical districting 
plans: “In one State, Party X controls the apportionment process and draws the lines so it 
captures every congressional seat. In three other States, Party Y controls the 
apportionment process. It is not so blatant or egregious, but proceeds by a more subtle 
effort, capturing less than all the seats in each State. Still, the total effect of Party Y’s 
effort is to capture more new seats than Party X captured. Party X’s gerrymander was 
more egregious. Party Y’s gerrymander was more subtle. In my view, however, each is 
culpable.”26 While Justice Kennedy is vague about what conclusions should follow from 
the possibility that partisan gerrymanders may either accumulate or cancel out across 
several states, his example does implicitly acknowledge the possibility that a 
congressional delegation-centric perspective may be inadequate to identify certain harms 
that might flow from partisan gerrymanders. 
Like the Court, the substantial commentary about Vieth has also been inattentive to 
the important analytic differences between Vieth and Bandemer.27 Legal commentators 
have widely criticized the Court for continuing, or perhaps even exacerbating, the 
jurisprudential muddle that has existed since Bandemer was handed down eighteen years 
ago.28 But none has criticized the Court’s decision to treat congressional and state 
legislative districting as the same. To the contrary, legal scholarship appears to have 
uniformly overlooked the analytic significance of the disaggregated nature of 
                                                 
26 Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1798 (Kennedy concurring). 
27 Lower courts have also been inattentive to the distinction, regularly applying Bandemer in the 
congressional context without discussion. See, for example, O’Lear v Miller, 222 F Supp 2d 850, 853–59 
(ED Mich 2002) (employing Bandemer to evaluate Michigan’s congressional districts, and adopting a 
state-wide, delegation-specific perspective). Moreover, on at least one occasion a lower court expressly 
refused to treat congressional partisan gerrymandering claims differently than state legislative ones. See, 
for example, Badham v Eu, 694 F Supp 664, 668 (ND Cal 1988). Consider also Anne Arundel County 
Republican Central Committee v State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F Supp 394, 399 & n 7 (D 
Maryland 1991) (noting that Bandemer “address[ed] a challenge to the partisan redistricting of the Indiana 
legislature, not to congressional redistricting,” but nonetheless applying Bandemer to evaluate the 
constitutionality of Maryland’s congressional redistricting scheme).  
28 See, for example, Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the 
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U Pa L Rev 503 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, Where to 
Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U Pa L Rev 541 (2004). When the 
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Vieth, most observers predicted that this meant the Court 
would clarify partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence by either reaffirming the justiciability of partisan 
gerrymandering claims and supplying a more workable standard for adjudicating such claims, or by 
overruling Bandemer and holding that partisan gerrymandering claims present nonjusticiable political 
questions. Instead, the Court fractured so badly that it was not able to head down either of these paths. 
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congressional redistricting.29 The scholarship suffers from the same blind spot that 
afflicts the Court in Vieth. 
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING’S HARMS: THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS 
While the literature has treated partisan gerrymandering claims in the state 
legislative and congressional contexts as interchangeable, the dominant accounts of why 
partisan gerrymanders are harmful cannot be squared with this undifferentiated treatment. 
The disaggregated nature of congressional redistricting makes it impossible for a court 
evaluating one state’s congressional redistricting scheme to identify injuries that stem 
from the manipulation of the legislative assembly as a whole. But the central 
contemporary accounts of partisan gerrymandering’s harms—the partisan bias account 
and the anticompetition account—conceptualize those injuries at the legislature-wide 
level. They do not explain why the partisan manipulation of a small subset of seats within 
the legislature is harmful, independent of what happens to other seats. Consequently, a 
court reviewing a congressional redistricting plan for these injuries cannot determine—at 
least within the current structure of redistricting litigation—whether that plan does or 
does not cause an injury.30 
A. The Partisan Bias Account 
One central contemporary account of the injury caused by partisan gerrymanders 
identifies the harm as the introduction of partisan bias. Theories of partisan bias condemn 
districting arrangements that make it easier for one party than the other to convert votes 
cast in its favor on election day into legislative seats.31 The injury occurs, in other words, 
when one party can capture a greater share of seats in the legislature than the other party 
                                                 
29 See, for example Gerken, 153 U Pa L Rev at 505-10 (cited in note 28) (arguing that Vieth involves 
“structural” rather than “individual rights” claims and contending that those claims need to be resolved at 
the state level, rather than the individual voter or district level). In this year’s Harvard Law Review 
Foreword, Richard Pildes does hint at the potential significance of congressional redistricting’s 
disaggregated nature. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 
118 Harv L Rev 28, 73 (2004) (“Unlike a state house or senate, in which majority control of representation 
translates into majority control of governance, majority control of a congressional delegation translates into 
no value other than fair representation itself . . . .”). The Foreword continues to argue, however, that “[t]he 
baseline for measuring whether, and to what extent, unfair partisan gerrymandering has occurred must be 
statewide.” Id. 
30 In describing these accounts of the harmfulness of partisan gerrymandering, I do not mean to defend 
the idea that partisan bias, anticompetitive effects, or both are harms that we should be trying to prevent. 
Rather, my claim is simply that these notions of harm, whatever their appeal as normative principles, are 
typically conceptualized as systemwide injuries produced by redistricting. 
31 For a detailed explanation of partisan bias, see Gary King, Representation Through Legislative 
Redistricting: A Stochastic Model, 33 Am J Pol Sci 787 (1989). 
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for a given level of electoral support. For example, if Democrats garner 53% of the vote 
and thereby capture 60% of the seats in the legislature, then in an unbiased system the 
Republicans will also capture 60% of the legislative seats if they garner 53% of the vote. 
If the Republicans were to capture a greater seat share in this situation—say 70%—the 
system would contain partisan bias in favor of the Republicans.32 
Because partisan bias is a function of how votes translate into a party’s share of 
seats in a legislative assembly,33 partisan bias in congressional districting cannot be 
identified by evaluating one state’s congressional redistricting plan in isolation. Whether 
an effort to gerrymander one state’s congressional districts for political gain actually 
introduces partisan bias into the composition of Congress can be determined only by 
reference to what has happened to the congressional districts in other states as well. 
Congressional gerrymanders in different states may tend to accumulate in a way that 
introduces partisan bias in Congress—or they may cancel each other out—but there is no 
way to determine this by examining one congressional districting plan in isolation. 
Of course, one could say that partisan bias exists whenever one party can capture 
more seats in a congressional delegation then the other party for a given level of electoral 
support in the state. But it is not clear why we should care about partisan symmetry in a 
small subset of the legislature’s districts. The partisan distribution of legislative power, 
which is what the bias account is concerned with, is a function of how many seats each 
party holds (to be more precise, its seat share) in the legislative assembly as a whole.34 
The seat share of each party in Congress is obviously connected to the composition of 
each congressional delegation, but those delegations are, for these purposes, in some 
sense arbitrary subparts of the legislative institution. The bias account’s concern about 
                                                 
32 Note that this account of partisan fairness requires only symmetry, not proportionality, in the 
translation of votes into seats. An absence of partisan bias is perfectly consistent with the presence of a 
system wide “winner’s bonus”—that is, with the party that garners a majority of the vote capturing a larger 
majority of the legislative seats. Thus, this sort of fairness does not call into question the single-member 
districted electoral structure used in congressional elections, even though single member districts typically 
lead to a winner’s bonus. 
33 For statements in the scholarship to the effect that the concept of partisan bias is defined with 
reference to the legislature as a whole, see, for example, Gary King, Electoral Responsiveness And Partisan 
Bias in Multiparty Democracies, XV Legis. Stud. Q. 159, 160 (1990); Sam Hirsch, The United States 
House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Districting, 2 
Election L J 179, 190 (2003). 
34 See, for example, Andrew Gelman and Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative 
Redistricting, 88 Am Pol Sci Rev 541, 543–46 (1994). 
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the distribution of party power in the legislature does not provide any reason why one 
would care about the existence of partisan bias in such a subpart, except to the extent that 
such bias influenced the level of bias in the system as a whole. 
The fact that partisan bias in congressional redistricting cannot be identified at the 
state level means that one cannot evaluate congressional and state legislative redistricting 
in the same way so long as the partisan bias is the injury that one is trying to identify.35 
Nonetheless, case law and legal scholarship sometimes apply the concept of partisan bias 
to congressional redistricting plans that affect the composition of only individual 
congressional delegations—without appearing to recognize that the theory underlying the 
concept does not explain why partisan bias in a state’s congressional delegation is 
undesirable.36 
Justice Breyer appears to make just this error in Vieth. He argued in that case that 
the Court should police the congressional redistricting process in order to prevent 
“unjustified entrenchment.”37 Breyer defined entrenchment as “a situation in which a 
party that enjoys only minority support among the populace has nonetheless continued to 
take, and hold, legislative power.”38 The central feature of this entrenchment injury—the 
idea that the harm occurs when a party that receives a minority of the vote can capture a 
majority of the seats—is a close variant of the bias injury. As with partisan bias, the 
concern is that one party can translate its votes into legislative seats more efficiently than 
the other party: on Breyer’s definition one party can capture a majority of the seats with a 
minority of the votes, but the other party would by definition capture less than a majority 
of the seats were it to receive a minority of the vote.39 Breyer identified the democratic 
                                                 
35 This does not mean, of course, that it is impossible to intervene at the state level to police national 
partisan bias. Rather, it means only that a court cannot determine whether the Congress contains partisan by 
examining a single state’s congressional redistricting plan in isolation. I discuss in Part IV the possibility 
that courts might be able to intervene at the state level to control national partisan bias even if they cannot 
directly identify its presence or absence.  
36 See Cox, 79 NYU L Rev at 767 n 60 (cited in note 12) (noting that the jurisprudence and legal 
literature commonly focus on partisan bias at the congressional delegation level). 
37 Vieth v Jubelirer, 124 S Ct 1769, 1825 (2004) (Breyer dissenting). 
38 Id. 
39 In fact, this demonstrates that the point about partisan bias can be generalized to any theory under 
which partisan gerrymandering’s injury is a function of how votes translate into a seat share of legislative 
power. Consider, for example, the position that partisan fairness in districting should be defined by 
reference to proportional representation. This idea of partisan fairness is quite different from a prohibition 
on partisan bias, and it requires that one commit to a different concept of representation. But proportional 
representation is like partisan bias in one important respect. Both are a function of the relationship between 
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harm of unjustified entrenchment as flowing from the principle of majority control of 
legislative bodies: “[I]t would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State 
could elect a majority of that State’s legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction 
minority control of state legislative bodies, [would violate the principle that legislatures] 
should be bodies which are collectively responsible to the popular will.”40 This principle 
of majoritarianism, he concluded, condemns “entrenchment where the House of 
Representatives or similar state legislative body is at issue.”41 But while Breyer grounded 
his theory of harm in the principle of majority control of legislative bodies, he applied the 
concept to the congressional redistricting plan at issue in Vieth—despite the fact that it 
would be impossible to tell by examining that plan whether there was unjustified 
minority entrenchment in the House of Representatives.42 
B. The Anticompetition Account 
A second central account of the injury caused by partisan gerrymandering identifies 
the harm as the reduction of electoral competition. This account of gerrymandering’s 
harm is grounded on the legal theory of political competition that Samuel Issacharoff and 
Richard Pildes have elaborated in recent years.43 Their work draws on existing 
competition-based accounts of democracy in the political science literature,44 along with 
an analogy to antitrust doctrine, to suggest that courts should use constitutional law to 
                                                                                                                                                 
votes and seat share in the legislature. As a result, neither can be identified by examining the votes-to-seats 
relationship for a small subset of the legislative assembly. 
40 Id at 1825 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 Id. 
42 The plaintiffs in Vieth appear to make a similar mistake. They argue that Pennsylvania’s redistricting 
plan causes a constitutionally cognizable harm because it enables a Republican minority to capture a 
majority of the state’s congressional delegation. See Brief for Appellants, Vieth v Jubelirer, No. 02-1580, 
*3 (filed Aug 29, 2003) (available on Lexis at 2002 US Briefs 1580) (arguing for judicial intervention 
where partisan manipulation of district lines “reaches the point where one political party guarantees itself a 
solid majority of seats, even if [that party] wins only a minority of the votes”). But they argue that this 
consequence of the districting plan constitutes a cognizable harm because it violates principles of 
legislative majoritarianism. See id at *22 (“[A] biased map designed to transform a voting minority into a 
legislative majority is . . . a clear violation of the principle of electoral equality . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
See also id (quoting Reynolds v Sims for the proposition that a majority of voters should be able to control 
the composition of the majority in the legislature). 
43 See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups 
of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan L Rev 643 (1997); Richard H. Pildes, A Theory of Political 
Competition, 85 Va L Rev 1605 (1999). 
44 See, for example, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper 1942); 
Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard 2003). See also Richard H. Pildes, 
Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 Election L Q 685 (2004) (reviewing Law, 
Pragmatism, and Democracy). 
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invalidate legal rules that are designed to reduce the competitiveness of political 
markets.45 In a recent piece in Harvard Law Review, Issacharoff applied this theory and 
its antitrust analogy to the redistricting process.46 He argued that partisan gerrymandering 
is harmful where it leads to a “constriction of the competitive processes by which voters 
can express choice,” and he contended that courts should intervene to prevent this harm.47 
Whether the anticompetition account of the harm of partisan gerrymandering 
embodies a legislature-wide institutional perspective turns on how the account answers 
the question: competition for what? Must every seat be competitive? Every congressional 
delegation? Or is the account concerned with the legislature as a whole? Perhaps 
surprisingly, it turns out that this question gets largely ignored when the anticompetition 
account is employed against partisan gerrymandering.48 Unlike the partisan bias account, 
                                                 
45 I say somewhat elliptically that the theory is concerned with regulations of the political process that 
are “designed” to reduce competition because the theory is a bit vague about whether it is concerned with: 
(1) legal rules that depress competition, regardless of the reasons for those legal rules (although the reasons 
might in some cases be evidence of the actual effect of the rules); (2) legal rules that are adopted for the 
reason of depressing competition, regardless of the actual effect of the rules on competition; or (3) legal 
rules that are both adopted for the reason of depressing competition and have the effect of doing so. 
Different theories of political philosophy and constitutional law could underwrite any one of these variants, 
and it is difficult to read Pildes’s and Issacharoff’s political markets approach as clearly endorsing one of 
these possibilities to the exclusion of the others. That said, I will treat the anticompetition account as 
ultimately concerned with the actual anticompetitive consequences of particular electoral rules. (I discuss in 
Part III the implications of injury theories that are completely disconnected from electoral consequences.) 
This is the conventional understanding of the account in both the legal and political theory literature, and 
Issacharoff appears to focus on actual electoral consequences when he applies the anticompetition idea to 
political gerrymandering. See, for example, Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 
116 Harv L Rev 593, 622 (2002) (focusing on “whether the parties are forced to compete for the votes of 
the electorate . . . and are in a deep sense accountable to changes in the preferences of the electorate . . . . on 
this view, the competitiveness of elections emerges as a central guarantee of the integrity of democratic 
governance”); id at 600 (describing partisan gerrymandering’s injury as the “constriction of the competitive 
processes by which voters can express choice”); id at 615 (arguing for focus on ensuring the existence of an 
“appropriately competitive electoral process”). Consider also Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties With 
Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum L Rev 
274, 280–81, 299, 308–09 (2001) (describing the “functional” anticompetitive account as concerned with 
ensuring the “proper level of competitiveness in the political marketplace,” suggesting that the theory’s 
application to a particular regulatory practice should turn on the existence or absence of empirical evidence 
that the practice actually disables competition). To the extent Issacharoff focuses on the reasons (or 
purposes) underlying redistricting legislation, it seems to be because he sees these reasons as proxies for (or 
evidence of) the actual anticompetitive effects of redistricting plans. See Issacharoff, 116 Harv L Rev at 
626 (cited above). 
46 Issacharoff, 116 Harv L Rev 593 (cited in note 45). 
47 Issacharoff, 116 Harv L Rev at 600 (cited in note 45). 
48 This ambiguity itself has gone unnoticed in the literature. The most common criticism of Pildes and 
Issacharoff’s theory is that it does not answer the question “How much competition?”—that is, that the 
theory leaves unspecified (in a way that the bias account does not) the baseline from which a court would 
measure distortions in the system. See, for example, Richard L. Hasen, The “Political Market” Metaphor 
and Election Law: A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50 Stan L Rev 719, 724–28 (1998); Bruce E. 
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which expressly adopts a legislature-wide institutional perspective, descriptions of the 
anticompetition account have been inattentive to the question of institutional 
perspective.49 
Given the seeming ambiguity of the anticompetition account, one might think that 
the account is perfectly consistent with any of the available institutional perspectives. If 
that were true, then in the context of congressional gerrymandering the account could be 
read as concerned with protecting electoral competition in individual districts, in state 
congressional delegations, or in Congress as a whole. And if the injury could be 
identified by reference to congressional delegations or individual districts, congressional 
partisan gerrymanders would not necessarily pose different challenges for courts than 
state legislative gerrymanders. Nonetheless, while anticompetition effects could be 
identified from any of the institutional perspectives described above, the theory driving 
the account is actually quite difficult to square with anything other than the legislature-
wide perspective. Like the bias account, the anticompetition account’s underlying theory 
of harm does not justify concern for the consequences of redistricting for individual 
congressional delegations in isolation.50 
Certain features of districted elections make it very difficult to reconcile the 
anticompetition account with an institutional focus on individual districts or 
congressional delegations. As I noted above, the anticompetition account is grounded in 
the idea that competitive pressure is necessary to make a legislative institution as a whole 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cain, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 Va L Rev 1589, 1600–03 (1999). But see Richard H. Pildes, A Theory of 
Political Competition, 85 Va L Rev 1605 (cited in note 43) (responding to this criticism). This objection is, 
in my view, overblown and in any case is not relevant to my point here. 
49 Issacharoff never explicitly specifies the object of competition when he argues that congressional 
partisan gerrymanders should be policed to protect competition. In some places, he does suggest a 
legislature-wide institutional perspective. For example, his emphasis on the responsiveness of the 
legislative assembly as a whole to shifts in electoral preferences suggests such a perspective. Issacharoff, 
116 Harv L Rev at 615 (cited in note 45). Moreover, Issacharoff relies extensively on evidence about the 
current nationwide competitiveness of congressional races to support his claim that political gerrymanders 
have produced detrimental anticompetitive effects. Id at 623–24. He highlights the large fraction of 
congressional seats that are uncompetitive, and suggests that it is the size of this fraction, and not the fact 
that any individual congressional seat is uncompetitive, that gives rise to the harm. But elsewhere he relies 
on evidence that is more consistent with a focus on congressional delegations rather than Congress. Id at 
623, 625. 
50 As with partisan bias, this conclusion does not mean that it is impossible to intervene state-by-state 
to police national anticompetitive effects. See note 35. See also Part IV (discussing the possibility of state-
by-state intervention). It does mean, however, that courts cannot identify the existence of the 
anticompetitive harms by examining any individual state’s redistricting plan in isolation. 
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responsive to the will of the electorate. It is true that one way to ensure the 
responsiveness of the legislative assembly would be to guarantee that every individual 
legislator is responsive by requiring high levels of interparty competition for every seat. 
But single member districted elections are largely incompatible with a rule that requires 
competitive elections in every district. First, as a practical matter it will often be difficult 
or impossible to draw all districts to be competitive. Where a state leans heavily in favor 
of one party, for example, it is impossible for the general elections in every congressional 
district to be competitive. Likewise, in places where there are large, geographically 
compact, politically homogenous groups of voters, there may be no reasonable 
redistricting arrangement that is capable of carving up these pockets of partisan voters 
into seats that produce competitive general elections.51 
Even where districts could be drawn that would make elections in every district 
competitive—perhaps in some states that are closely divided between the parties, for 
example—democratic theorists generally agree that it would be a very bad idea to draw 
districts that produced only close races. If every district were highly competitive, the 
system would have two features that these theorists often argue are undesirable: first, the 
system of representation would be extremely volatile; second, it would begin to approach 
a pure winner take all system, where the party that captured a slim majority of the 
statewide vote could easily capture nearly all of the state’s seats.52 While such a result is 
not necessarily a bad thing, there is no suggestion in the literature that partisan 
gerrymandering’s injury is that it does not create a sufficiently winner-take-all system of 
representation, and Issacharoff expressly disclaims the idea that this is the 
anticompetition injury that concerns him.53 Accordingly, he acknowledges that the 
                                                 
51 I say “reasonable” because it is technically possible to divide any bloc of partisan voters, so long as 
one is willing to ignore entirely any interest in drawing districts that are contiguous, compact, etc.—that is, 
so long as one is willing to abandon any connection between districted elections and physical geography. 
52 In the limiting case where each party captures the same vote share in every district that it captures 
system-wide (the districts-as-microcosms condition), the electoral structure creates a pure winner-take-all 
system. The party that captures of majority of the system-wide vote will capture every legislative seat. 
Drawing lines to produce competition in every district increases the probability of this result. 
53 See Issacharoff and Karlan, 153 U Pa L Rev at 574 (cited in note 28). Consider also Issacharoff, 116 
Harv L Rev at 628 (cited in note 45) (“No districting scheme could (or should) aspire to recreate the exact 
partisan balance of the state or jurisdiction as a whole [because] [t]he resulting legislature would replicate 
the winner-take-all feature of at-large elections . . . .”). 
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anticompetition account does not operate at the district level; it is perfectly consistent 
with the account, he concludes, for some individual districts to be noncompetitive.54  
The fact that it is difficult to make sense of the anti-competition harm at the level of 
individual districts makes it hard to understand at the congressional delegation level as 
well. As Issacharoff notes, “[t]he normal distribution of populations across 435 
congressional districts will yield a range of districts, from those that are highly 
competitive and will likely elect centrist candidates or swing from election to election 
between the two major parties, to those that are more politically homogenous and will 
gravitate toward the poles of the political spectrum.”55 Once we agree that a perfectly 
healthy system of congressional representation can contain a number of noncompetitive 
seats, however, one would need -- in order to defend a delegation-specific perspective for 
the anticompetition harm -- an independent justification of why it is undesirable to lump a 
number of those noncompetitive seats in one congressional delegation. The existing 
literature contains no account of why it might be undesirable for noncompetitive seats to 
be clustered closely together as a matter of geography. (And, in fact, there is some 
empirical evidence that such clustering is a natural tendency for districting in the United 
States.) Moreover, even if one had a theory about why such geographic clustering was a 
problem, one would still need to explain why it would make sense to privilege, for 
purposes of identifying such clustering, the subparts of the legislative institution 
constituted by each state’s congressional districts over subparts of the legislative 
institution defined in some other fashion. Needless to say, an explanation of this is also 
absent from the existing literature. 
In short, therefore, the anticompetition account of the injury caused by partisan 
gerrymandering is most sympathetically understood as concerned with the system-wide 
effect on legislative responsiveness of anticompetitive districting practices. As such, the 
injury can only be identified by understanding the electoral consequences of redistricting 
for congressional representation as a whole. The injury cannot be identified by examining 
one state’s congressional redistricting scheme in isolation. 
                                                 
54 See Issacharoff and Karlan, 153 U Pa L Rev at 574 (cited in note 28). 
55 Id. 
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III. THE POSSIBILITY OF DELEGATION-SPECIFIC HARMS 
Perhaps an alternative account of the harmfulness of partisan gerrymandering can 
salvage the delegation-specific focus of congressional gerrymandering cases. In this Part, 
I will discuss a few possibilities. The first is what I will call the polarization account. 
While this injury theory might seem initially appealing, it turns out to have the same 
structure as the bias and competition accounts discussed above: the injury is typically 
conceptualized at the level of the legislative assembly and it is difficult to explain why 
polarization within a single congressional delegation would be cause for concern. Thus, 
this alternative account of the harm that flows from partisan gerrymanders does not 
underwrite the courts’ identical treatment of congressional and state legislative political 
gerrymanders. Second, I will discuss the possibility of rehabilitating the congressional-
delegation-specific focus by shifting away from the first-order electoral consequences of 
redistricting and toward the reasons underlying redistricting legislation. Such a shift in 
perspective can save the focus on individual congressional redistricting plans, but it can 
do so only by ignoring the inevitable role partisanship plays in the redistricting process 
and by abandoning the focus on the actual electoral consequences of redistricting 
legislation. Last, I will explore the possibility of saving the delegation-specific focus by 
conceptually disaggregating the major political parties into separate state groups. 
Disaggregating the parties, however, does nothing to shift the focus of the conventional 
injury accounts away from the legislature as a whole. 
A. The Polarization Account 
One possible alternative account of harm is that we might be concerned that 
partisan gerrymanders will lead to more polarized congressional delegations—that is, that 
such gerrymanders would systematically eliminate centrist legislators, both Democrat and 
Republican, even if they did not introduce bias or decrease competition.56 Despite the 
                                                 
56 Sam Issacharoff and Pam Karlan have recently suggested that polarization represents one of the 
harms caused by partisan gerrymandering. See Issacharoff and Karlan, 153 U Pa L Rev at 574 (cited in 
note 28) (“The perverse consequence of the incumbent gerrymander is that it skews the distribution 
politically by driving the center out of elected office at the legislative level.”). Consider also Samuel 
Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Engendered Center in American Politics, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 415, 
427–28 (2004) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering eliminates the mechanisms that “pull partisan 
impulses back toward the electoral center”); Issacharoff, 116 Harv L Rev at 628–29 (cited in note 45) (“If 
each district can potentially be gerrymandered to render it uncompetitive, the result is to create strong 
incentives toward polarization as the parties become more susceptible to partisan homogeneity . . . .”). To 
be clear, however, Issacharoff and Karlan appear to be suggesting a slightly different argument than the one 
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superficial appeal of this account, it suffers from two shortcomings. First, the link 
between partisan gerrymandering and increased polarization is not as clear as is 
frequently suggested. More important, to the extent such gerrymanders produce 
polarization, it is polarization of the structure of representation in the legislature as a 
whole that is a concern, not polarization in any individual district or small subset of the 
legislative assembly. In other words, this theory of democratic injury shares the same 
structure as the partisan bias and anticompetition injuries. 
Whether partisan gerrymanders lead to the selection of more ideologically extreme 
legislators is difficult to determine both theoretically and empirically. In part, it depends 
on the type of partisan gerrymander that a state undertakes. Political gerrymanders are 
often divided into two types: partisan and bipartisan.57 Partisan gerrymanders are those in 
which one political party draws district lines that favor it and harm the other party. In 
contrast, bipartisan gerrymanders are those in which both parties agree to draw district 
lines that make each party more secure, without necessarily favoring one party over the 
other.58 While the distinction between these two types of gerrymanders is somewhat 
crude, it can be made more precise by treating partisan gerrymanders as those that 
introduce bias into the system and bipartisan gerrymanders as those that reduce the 
competitiveness (or responsiveness) of the system.59 In practice, political gerrymanders 
are often a hybrid of these two types.60 Nonetheless, distinguishing between bias effects 
                                                                                                                                                 
I describe above. They hint (and Issacharoff states more directly in another recent article) that the degree of 
polarization may be correlated with a lack of accountability to changes in the electorate’s political 
preferences. See Issacharoff and Karlan, 153 U Pa L Rev at 574 (cited in note 28); Issacharoff, 46 Wm & 
Mary L Rev at 425 (cited in note 56) (“As a result [of polarization], the elected representatives are 
increasingly removed from the population’s preferences and unaccountable to changes in the desires or 
views of the electorate.”). In other words, they link the polarization idea with the anticompetition idea. At 
least in theory, however, these concepts need not be linked: Congress can become more polarized without 
become less responsive to shifts in electoral preferences. 
57 See, for example, David Butler and Bruce Cain, Congressional Redistricting: Comparative and 
Theoretical Perspectives 9–11 (Macmillan 1992). 
58 See Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences 
of the Reapportionment Revolution 31 (Cambridge 2001). 
59 Of course, this typology is itself somewhat crude. Under certain conditions, a party in control of the 
redistricting process might seek to maximize its seat share by increasing responsiveness. See Cox and Katz, 
Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander at 33 (cited in note 58). 
60 For a formal description of the redistricting process that models the relationship between bias and 
responsiveness under different contexts, see Cox and Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander at 31–43 (cited in 
note 58). 
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and competition effects is crucial to assessing the claim that partisan gerrymanders lead 
to a more polarized legislative body. 
There is little reason to think that partisan gerrymanders—that is, gerrymanders 
that introduce bias in favor of one party—will have a systematically polarizing effect on 
the composition of a state’s congressional delegation. In order to introduce bias into a 
districting arrangement, redistricting authorities take advantage of the fact that voters of 
different partisanship are not distributed evenly around the state.61 This uneven 
distribution makes it possible to draw district lines that affect the expected partisan 
composition of different districts. To bias a districting plan in favor of Republicans, for 
example, redistricting authorities “pack” and “crack” voters that tend to support 
Democrats. Packing Democratic voters into a small number of districts where they 
constitute large super-majorities ensures Democratic victories in those districts but 
reduces the total number of seats Democrats capture by increasing the number of wasted 
Democratic votes—that is, votes cast for Democrats that are either unnecessary or 
insufficient to win a seat. Cracking, the complement of packing, similarly wastes 
Democratic votes by splitting blocks of Democratic voters into a number of districts 
where Republican voters will predominate. By maximizing the number of wasted votes 
for the other party and minimizing the number of wasted votes for itself, a party in 
control of redistricting distributes its votes more efficiently, and thereby biases a 
districting plan in its favor. 
While introducing bias into a congressional delegation in this fashion will change 
the expected partisan composition of each district, it will not necessarily increase the 
extent to which the composition of the delegation is polarized. As the above explanation 
demonstrates, in order to increase bias the party in control of redistricting generally has to 
spread itself more thinly across seats that it hopes to win (in order to lower the number of 
wasted votes cast in its favor). But the ideological polarization of an individual 
representative is often thought to be related to how much interparty competition there is 
for the representative’s seat: safe seats produce more polarized representatives because, 
by definition, the median voter in a district that is closely divided between the two major 
parties is more centrist than the median voter in a district dominated by one party. Thus, 
                                                 
61 If voter partisanship were evenly distributed, the placement of district lines would have no effect. 
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depending on what one thinks the favored party’s districts would look like absent the 
existence of a partisan gerrymander, it may be that representatives elected from many of 
the favored party’s districts will be less polarized than they otherwise would have been. 
While the representatives elected from the packed disfavored party’s districts will likely 
be more polarized (because those districts are likely to be dominated by supermajorities 
of voters from the disfavored party), it is difficult to know whether the end product of the 
gerrymander will be to increase or decrease the aggregate level of polarization within the 
congressional delegation. 
In contrast, bipartisan gerrymanders should predictably lead to greater polarization 
in congressional delegations. Such gerrymanders aim to increase the number of safe, 
noncompetitive seats, and as explained above these less competitive seats are likely to 
produce more polarized legislators. Thus, whether political gerrymanders actually have a 
polarizing effect depends on the type of partisan manipulation undertaken. Nonetheless, 
because bipartisan gerrymanders should polarize representation (and, more to the point, 
because most partisan gerrymanders reflect an effort both to introduce bias and to depress 
competition), this obstacle is not fatal to the polarization account. 
Even if congressional political gerrymanders do lead to polarization within 
congressional delegations in some contexts, however, one would need an independent 
normative account of why the polarization of a state’s congressional delegation was 
harmful. The central difficulty with developing such an account is that one immediately 
runs into the same problem encountered in Part II: existing discussions of the 
consequences and concerns flowing from the polarization of representation typically 
focus on the risk of polarization in the legislature as a whole. Thus, shifting the focus 
from bias or competitiveness to the potential harm of polarization likely does not solve 
the central problem that plagues the conventional harm accounts; like those accounts, the 
polarization account describes a potential electoral consequence of redistricting that is 
typically conceptualized at the institutional level of the legislature, rather than at the level 
of some subset of the legislature. 
The reasons for the legislature-wide focus are the same ones we have already seen. 
Scholars are interested in the concept of polarization because they care about the 
relationship between the composition of the electorate and the overall structure of 
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representation in legislative institutions. This focus leads naturally to a systemwide 
institutional perspective. In addition, it is difficult to see how the concept of polarization 
could have much purchase at lower institutional levels. The polarization account is 
difficult to square with a district-level perspective for the same reason as the 
anticompetition account: districted elections tend to produce (and are often considered 
desirable because they produce) different levels of interparty competition in different 
districts. As a result, it is too much to expect that every district will produce fairly centrist 
legislators. And as with the anticompetition account, once one abandons the district-level 
inquiry, it is difficult to explain why it would matter if a few districts that produced 
ideological legislators were in close geographic proximity. For this reason, discussions of 
polarization typically measure and evaluate polarization at the level of the legislature as a 
whole. Because the polarization account adopts a legislature-wide perspective, the 
polarizing effect of one state’s congressional gerrymander can only be determined by 
reference to what happens in other states. Thus, this account of partisan gerrymandering’s 
harm cannot save the delegation-specific focus. 
As with bias and competition, it is plausible that polarization caused by 
congressional political gerrymanders will accumulate across states and thereby increase 
the level of polarization in Congress. This would not salvage the delegation-specific 
polarization injury, but it would create the possibility of a Congress-wide injury that 
courts could attempt to remedy by intervening on a state-by-state basis. I discuss in Part 
IV the potential judicial strategy of intervening at the congressional delegation level to 
police a legislature-wide injury. My central point here is only that the polarization 
account does not justify judicial efforts to identify the injury by examining a single state’s 
congressional rejecting scheme. 
I should note, however, that intervening to prevent Congress as a whole from 
becoming more polarized would still require a theory about why greater polarization in 
Congress is harmful. One possibility is that such polarization is harmful because it alters 
the policy choices that Congress enacts. It is not clear, however, exactly how greater 
polarization will alter the content of the laws that Congress enacts. The effects of greater 
polarization on the legislative dynamics of Congress are quite complex. A median voter 
model of legislative behavior might predict that polarization would have no effect on 
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legislative outcomes, because greater polarization would simply increase the dispersion 
of legislators without altering the position of the median legislator. In contrast, more 
deliberative models of congressional behavior might predict that greater polarization 
would lower the quality of deliberation, resulting in different legislative outcomes. In any 
event, even if one could demonstrate that polarization altered outcomes, one would need 
to explain why the outcomes produced by the more polarized Congress are worse. After 
all, a certain degree of polarization might help curb certain deliberative pathologies that 
can affect group decision-making.62 Moreover, the idea that the ideological positions of 
legislators should mirror the ideological positions of voters represents an implicit 
commitment to a certain conception of representation and a certain set of theories about 
how democratic decisionmaking should best be structured to produce good outcomes.63 
The question of how representation of centrist attitudes should be traded off against 
representation of more extreme viewpoints in a legislative assembly is simply not subject 
to an easy answer.64 
My point is not to argue that polarization is unproblematic or affirmatively good. 
Rather, I just mean to question the easy assumption—an assumption no doubt facilitated 
by the pejorative connotation to the term itself—that any polarizing effect of 
congressional gerrymandering is harmful.65 More fundamentally, polarization, like 
                                                 
62 See, for example, Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 Yale L J 
71, 74, 109–10, 114–15 (2000) (explaining that, when groups of like-minded individuals deliberate, they 
may “predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ 
predeliberation tendencies”). See also Heather Gerken, Second-Order Diversity and Democracy, 118 Harv 
L Rev (forthcoming 2005). Polarization, which increases the difference between the viewpoints of those 
engaged in deliberation may, of course, also lead to deliberative pathologies. See Sunstein, 110 Yale L J at 
104–05. The point is just that one would need to know more to determine whether increased polarization 
would be better or worse in particular congressional decisionmaking contexts. 
63 See generally Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Univ California 1967). 
64 Note also that it may be a mistake to analyze the polarization of a legislative assembly like Congress 
in isolation. Polarization in Congress might be counteracted by other voter behavior within our democratic 
decisionmaking structure. There is evidence, for example, that increased polarization may strengthen public 
support for divided government, which can moderate the effects of polarization between the parties or 
within one institution of the legislative process. See Gary Jacobson, Party Polarization in National 
Politics: The Electoral Connection, in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds., Polarized Politics: Congress 
and the President in a Partisan Era 28–29 (Cong Quarterly 2000) [hereinafter Polarized Politics]. 
65 For the claim that it is harmful or bad for elected officials to be more polarized than the “population 
as a whole,” see Issacharoff, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev at 423–25 (cited in note 56). As I indicated above, it is 
a bit unclear whether Issacharoff is concerned with polarization itself or with the possibility that increased 
polarization will reduce the responsiveness of representatives to constituent preferences. See note 56. For 
some skepticism about this connection, see Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, Polarized Politics: Does It 
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partisan bias and anticompetitive effects, is a potential democratic harm that is 
consistently conceptualized at the institutional level of the legislature. The polarization 
account therefore does not save the effort to identify partisan gerrymandering’s harm at 
the level of individual congressional delegations. 
B. The Illegitimate Purpose Account 
Another way to rehabilitate the possibility that partisan gerrymandering produces 
meaningful delegation-specific injuries is to move away from the first-order electoral 
consequences of such gerrymanders and to focus instead on the process by which 
redistricting plans are produced.66 Perhaps the most plausible process-based account of 
partisan gerrymandering’s harm is the illegitimate purpose account. On this view, 
partisan gerrymanders are harmful because it is simply impermissible for the government 
to undertake redistricting for the purpose of partisan gain.67 This account salvages the 
possibility of a court determining whether an alleged congressional political gerrymander 
is harmful without paying attention to any other state’s congressional redistricting.68 
(After all, if the harm of partisan gerrymandering does not turn on the electoral 
consequences of the redistricting plans, then there would be no need to evaluate the 
combined consequences of every state’s congressional redistricting plans in order to 
determine whether the plans produced an injury.) It would also justify the Court’s 
decision in Vieth to review alleged congressional and state legislative partisan 
gerrymanders in the same way. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Matter?, in Polarized Politics at 193 (cited in note 64) (“There is little evidence to support a claim that 
members of Congress have become less responsive to constituent preferences.”). 
66 While it might seem easy to describe this shift as a shift from consequentialist to anti-
consequentialist theory, it is imprecise to describe the conceptual boundary in this fashion. A theory that 
does not focus on the direct electoral consequences of redistricting can still be consequentialist; it just does 
not turn on one particular consequence—the effect of the redistricting plan on the aggregation of votes. 
Consider Matthew Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of the American Constitution, 97 
Mich L Rev 1 (1998) (laying out a consequentialist account of constitutional law that focuses on the 
reasons for government action). For example, consider the possibility that a purposeful but completely 
ineffectual effort to gerrymander a state’s legislative districts would lead the public to see the political 
process as somehow less legitimate and thereby skew their incentives to participate. The injury would be 
rooted in the public’s perception of the redistricting purpose, but the harm could be understood in 
consequentialist terms as a function of the changes in political participation that resulted from the loss of 
perceived legitimacy. 
67 Justice Stevens proposed just this conception of harm in Vieth. See Vieth v Jubelirer, 124 S Ct 1769, 
1808–13 (2004). 
68 To be precise, this theory does not require reference to any set or subset of districts because its focus 
is on the process through which a state produces its districts, rather than on the districts produced by that 
process. 
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There are a variety of theories of constitutional law that might underwrite the 
position that partisan gerrymandering’s harm turns on the reasons for redistricting rather 
than on the direct electoral consequences of redistricting.69 While the illegitimate purpose 
account can therefore supply a coherent explanation of partisan gerrymandering’s harms 
that avoids the difficulties stemming from the disaggregated nature of congressional 
redistricting, the account remains conclusory. It asserts that partisan gain (or perhaps 
bipartisan entrenchment) is an impermissible reason for action in the redistricting context, 
but it does not justify that assertion.70 
In fact, there is reason to think that would be extremely difficult to justify the 
conclusion that partisan gain is an impermissible reason for action in the redistricting 
context -- that is, unless one was prepared to invalidate every redistricting plan enacted 
by a legislature.71 So long as legislatures are principally responsible for redrawing 
districts in this country, partisan advantage-seeking will be an inevitable component of 
redistricting. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this fact,72 and in Vieth 
nearly every member of the Court rejected the notion that proving partisan purpose itself 
could be enough to demonstrate that a redistricting plan constituted an unconstitutional 
                                                 
69 See, for example, Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional 
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup Ct Rev 95 (providing a political process-based account of why governmental 
decisions should be unconstitutional when they are motivated by illegitimate purposes); Richard H. Pildes 
and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U Pa L Rev 1503, 
1531 (2000) (arguing that the government should be prohibited from undertaking actions for certain 
morally impermissible reasons because “state action should be wrong . . . when it expresses impermissible 
valuations, without regard to further concerns about its cultural or material consequences”); Adler, 97 Mich 
L Rev 1 (cited in note 66) (arguing that constitutional rights should be understood to be “rights against 
rules”—that is, as prohibitions on the government infringing upon certain interests for impermissible 
reasons, rather than as shields protecting certain actions from government regulation). To be clear, these 
theories do not always equate the reasons for government action with legislative purpose as it is 
conventionally understood. See, for example, Pildes & Anderson, 148 U Pa L Rev at 1524-25 (making 
clear that their concern is with the social meaning of government action). For present purposes, however, 
these distinctions are not important. 
70 For an argument that partisan gain is a perfectly acceptable goal in the redistricting process, see 
Daniel H. Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, 33 UCLA L Rev 1, 73-75 (1986). 
71 Moreover, one cannot bootstrap electoral consequences into this theory by arguing that it makes 
sense to prohibit partisan purpose on the ground that partisan purpose is likely to be accompanied by 
partisan effects. If reasons for action are really just a proxy for expected effects, the theory collapses back 
into the theories discussed in the previous part that were concerned with the electoral consequences of 
redistricting. To treat reasons (or purpose) as a proxy for effect requires that one identify the “effect” about 
which one cares, which simply reintroduces the problem of choosing an institutional level from which to 
identify those effects. 
72 See, for example, Davis v Bandemer, 478 US 109, 128–29 (1986). See also Gaffney v Cummings, 
412 US 735, 753 (1973) (“The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial 
political consequences.”). 
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political gerrymander.73 Only Justice Stevens suggested that purpose alone should be the 
touchstone of the inquiry: he argued that where “the predominant motive of the 
legislators who designed [a district] . . . was a purpose to discriminate against a political 
minority, that invidious purpose should invalidate the district.74  
To be fair, Justice Stevens does not appear to advocate invalidating every district 
drawn in part with an eye to the partisan consequences of redistricting. Instead, he 
concludes that a district should be unconstitutional only where political discrimination 
was the “predominant motive” of the legislators.75 Stevens borrows the “predominant 
motive” test from the Shaw v Reno76 strand of the Supreme Court’s racial redistricting 
doctrine—the one other area of redistricting jurisprudence where the Court has stated that 
redistricting arrangements might be impermissible by virtue of the reasons that they were 
enacted, regardless of the effects of the redistricting schemes.77 In Shaw and its progeny, 
the Court concluded that districts drawn for the predominant purpose of segregating 
voters by race are unconstitutional.78 The electoral consequences of the district lines 
challenged in Shaw litigation are doctrinally irrelevant to their constitutionality.79 But not 
                                                 
73 See Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1785–86 (plurality); id at 1796–97 (Kennedy concurring); id at 1817–19 
(Souter, joined by Ginsburg, dissenting); id at 1823–25 (Breyer dissenting). See also Davis v Bandemer, 
478 US 109, 127, 130 (1986) (holding that the plaintiffs were required to show both discriminatory purpose 
and effect in order to demonstrate the existence of an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander). 
74 Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1810 (Stevens dissenting); id at 1799 (“In my view, when partisanship is the 
legislature’s sole motivation . . . the governing body cannot be said to have acted impartially.”); id at 1801 
(suggesting “purpose as the ultimate inquiry”); id at 1804 (“State action that discriminates . . . for the sole 
and unadorned purpose of maximizing the power of the majority plainly violates the decision-maker’s duty 
to remain impartial.”); id (“Thus, the critical issue in both racial and political gerrymandering cases is the 
same: whether a single non-neutral criterion controlled the districting process to such an extent that the 
Constitution was offended.”). Consider also Cox v Larios, 124 S Ct 2806, 2808 (2004) (Stevens 
concurring). 
75 Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1810. 
76 509 US 630 (1993). 
77 Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1802-04. 
78 See Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 915–16 (1995). 
79 Because the Shaw injury focuses on legislative motivations, it is conceptually distinct from a vote 
dilution claim; in fact, the Shaw plaintiffs specifically declined to allege that their voting power had been 
reduced by the voting scheme. See Shaw, 509 US at 641 (“In their complaint, appellants did not claim that 
the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally ‘diluted’ white voting strength.”). See also 
Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 Cal L Rev 373, 399 n 116 (2004). That 
said, Shaw itself hints that the origins of the doctrine may have been connected to Justice O’Connor’s 
concern drawing a district principally on the basis of race would affect the political dynamics within that 
district. See Shaw, 509 US at 647–48 (discussing possible representational harm).  
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every redistricting scheme drawn with race in mind is automatically invalid under the 
Shaw doctrine; only those districts drawn with race as a predominant purpose.80 
While requiring that partisan gain be the “predominant purpose” does alleviate 
slightly the concern that the illegitimate purpose account would render unconstitutional 
every redistricting plan drawn by a legislative assembly, it introduces other significant 
problems. Perhaps the most serious is that it is extremely difficult to figure out how a 
court can distinguish between cases where partisanship simply plays a role in the 
redistricting process and cases where partisan gain is the “predominant purpose.” This 
problem has plagued the Shaw jurisprudence from its outset. In fact, many commentators 
have argued that this difficulty renders Shaw’s predominant motive test completely 
unworkable, or perhaps even theoretically incoherent.81 
Even if these difficulties could be overcome, a purely purposive account of partisan 
gerrymandering’s harms runs counter to the predominant thrust of most contemporary 
redistricting scholarship, which focuses more and more today on functional, structural 
approaches to the constitutional regulation of the political process.82 For example, such a 
functional approach appears to be at the heart of the Pildes and Issacharoff’s antitrust 
theory of political process regulation. That approach seeks to “invert the focus of 
constitutional doctrine from the foreground of rights and equality to the background rules 
that structure partisan political competition”—that is, to focus attention on the actual 
electoral consequences of rules that regulate the political process.83 As I described above, 
Issacharoff has argued that this functional focus should guide partisan gerrymandering 
jurisprudence, with courts invalidating redistricting schemes that are likely to have 
anticompetitive effects on political representation. And in other areas legal scholars have 
advocated a similar focus on electoral consequences: Nathanial Persily, for example, has 
defended political party autonomy in primary elections on the ground that such autonomy 
                                                 
80 In other words, purpose is treated as a continuous variable, rather than as a dichotomous variable. 
81 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 
106 Yale L J 2505 (1997); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-
Shaw Era, 26 Cumb L Rev 287 (1996). See also Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 1059-62, 1069-71 (1996) 
(Souter dissenting). 
82 Of course, this contemporary trend is by no means limited to the political process domain of 
constitutional law. 
83 Pildes and Issacharoff, 50 Stan L Rev at 648 (cited in note 43). 
   
28 
preserves political competition.84 While these approaches are certainly not logically 
incompatible with reason-for-action based approaches that do not focus on electoral 
consequences,85 they do highlight the extent to which this alternative conception of injury 
is atypical in the literature today. 
In short, while the illegitimate purpose account of partisan gerrymandering’s harm 
does make it possible to rehabilitate the attempts in Vieth to identify the injuries of 
congressional partisan gerrymandering by reference to individual states, moving towards 
such an account would require a fairly substantial about-face in both the academy and the 
courts. It would also likely call into question the constitutionality of nearly every 
districting plan in the country. 
C. Defining Partisan “Groups” 
Finally, one might try to save Vieth’s focus on individual congressional delegations 
by contesting the definition of the relevant governing groups. Up to this point, I have 
focused principally on the effects of redistricting for the electoral prospects of the two 
major parties—Democrats and Republicans. This focus is common in the literature. One 
might claim, however, that it is wrong to treat Democrats and Republicans as monolithic 
groups. Perhaps it is more appropriate to disaggregate the political parties state by state. 
Treating the parties in each state as distinct would make it possible for a court in one state 
to compare the relative effects of a redistricting plan on the political parties in that state 
without reference to the treatment of other states’ parties. For example, a court could 
evaluate a single state’s congressional redistricting plan to determine whether the plan 
contained partisan bias in favor of one state party or the other. By definition, it might 
seem, this would solve the disaggregation problem and restore the delegation-specific 
focus. 
                                                 
84 Nathaniel Persily, Toward A Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 NYU L Rev 750, 
752 (2001). 
85 It is possible, for example, to be concerned both about the structural consequences of a law as well as 
its expressive significance. Richard Pildes, for example, appears to hold both commitments. He is a 
principle advocate for policing expressive harms in the constitutional regulation of the political process, 
see, for example, Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 483 (1993), 
and is also concerned about policing laws that have anticompetitive effects on the political process, see, for 
example, Pildes and Issacharoff, 50 Stan L Rev at 644–52 (cited in note 43). 
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This is all true so far as it goes. But there are two substantial difficulties with this 
line of argument. First is the problem that the same criticism could be leveled against the 
claim that a state-level focus is appropriate. Republicans or Democrats from any single 
state are far from monolithic, so this line of argument runs the risk of an infinite regress, 
the conclusion of which is that there is no way of talking sensibly about partisan 
groups—or at least that the institutional level from which one defines such groups is 
arbitrary. 
The threat of a regress shows that there is no “natural” institutional level from 
which partisan representation must always be defined.86 In part, this point reinforces the 
central thesis of this article, which is that it is a mistake for courts or scholars to 
unquestioningly adopt a state-level institutional perspective for evaluating the partisan 
consequences of congressional redistricting. My point, however, is not to develop a 
comprehensive theory about how to define the boundaries of partisan groups in all 
circumstances. Nor is my point that the focus of congressional redistricting must 
necessarily be on national, rather than local representation. My modest point is simply 
that the existing accounts about why we should care about partisan gerrymandering 
define the injuries that they identify by reference to characteristics of the system as a 
whole. 
More important, the delegation-specific focus cannot be saved by redefining the 
relevant partisan groups because it is the theory of injury, and not the scope of the 
relevant partisan groups, that determines the appropriate institutional level of focus. Even 
if it is correct that the best account of partisan groups would disaggregate those groups 
into state-party units, such disaggregation is not sufficient to support the claim that the 
injuries caused by congressional gerrymandering are delegation specific. Consider, for 
example, the conventional injury of partisan bias. This account of redistricting is 
concerned with the effect of redistricting on the relative ability of parties to translate 
electoral support into power in the legislative assembly. Defining the parties as state party 
units rather than as national parties does not change this focus; it just increases from two 
                                                 
86 For a general theoretical argument that voters should care about the composition of legislative 
assemblies, rather than the composition of some subpart of such assemblies, see Jean-Pierre Benoit & 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Assembly-Based Preferences, Candidate-Based Procedures, and the Voting Rights 
Act, 68 S Cal L Rev 1503 (1995). 
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to one hundred the number of (major) parties whose legislative power is at issue. In other 
words, disaggregating the parties would, on the partisan bias account of injury, increase 
the number of dimensions in the bias calculation, rather than decreasing the institutional 
level of inquiry.87 Certainly, one would care about whether Democrats from Texas were 
disadvantaged relative to Republicans from Texas in their ability to translate electoral 
support into power in Congress. But one would also care about whether Democrats from 
Texas were disadvantaged relative to Democrats from Michigan in this respect.88 For that 
reason, a court evaluating Texas’s redistricting scheme would still need to refer to 
Michigan’s districting scheme, as well as the districting arrangement in every other state, 
in order to determine whether the system contained partisan bias. Disaggregating the 
parties does not, therefore, define away the institutional-level problem. 
IV. RETHINKING VIETH 
The Court’s approach to the central justiciability question in Vieth was therefore 
misguided. The justices in Vieth disagreed sharply about the answer to question whether 
claims of congressional partisan gerrymandering should be justiciable. But they all 
approached the question in roughly the same fashion: nearly all of the justices focused 
exclusively on whether a test could be developed that would identify the constitutional 
harms flowing from an individual state’s putative congressional partisan gerrymander.89 
As I have shown, this approach is unlikely to succeed. To the extent that the harm of 
congressional gerrymanders can only be identified from a legislature-wide institutional 
                                                 
87 For one explanation of how bias can be calculated in multiparty settings where there are more than 
two parties, see King, XV Legis Stud Q at 161–67 (cited in note 33). 
88 In the post-Founding period, when the major parties were not the same across states, there was just 
this sort of inter-state conflict between the power of parties from small and large states. Small states tended 
to use at-large congressional elections during this period, while large states used districted elections. The 
different electoral procedures affected the composition of the states’ congressional delegations, because 
while the minority party tends to be overwhelmed in an at-large election, it stands a greater chance of 
success in districted elections. Thus, during this period the “small states sent more politically unified 
delegations to Congress than did large states. . . . [And because the small states’ more unified delegations 
tended to vote more frequently] as a bloc, they exercised an influence disproportionate to their numbers in 
the lower house.” Rosemarie Zagarri, The Politics of Size 126–27 (1987). This difference between small 
and large states led to repeated efforts in Congress to require districted elections throughout the country. 
See id at 128–31. In 1842, Congress finally adopted such a requirement, which remains on the books today. 
See 2 USC § 2c. 
89 The one partial exception is Justice Kennedy, who appeared to acknowledge that the aggregate 
consequences of congressional redistricting in several states might be relevant to the constitutional inquiry. 
See text accompanying note 26. While his opinion in Vieth has been perhaps the most widely derided, 
therefore, it may be the only opinion that points towards the shift in institutional perspective that the Court 
needs to make if it is to successfully police congressional partisan gerrymanders. 
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perspective, the Court will inevitably fail if it tries to pin the injury on individual 
congressional redistricting plans.90 
If the Court were to adopt a nationwide perspective in congressional partisan 
gerrymandering cases and give up on its efforts to figure out whether individual states’ 
congressional redistricting schemes did or did not produce constitutionally cognizable 
harms, it would be left with three options: develop tests to directly measure the harm of 
congressional gerrymanders at the legislature-wide level; give up on trying to develop 
criteria for measuring the harm directly and focus instead on developing constitutional 
rules that reduce the risk that state redistricting efforts will combine to produce a 
Congress-wide injury; or abandon judicial review of congressional partisan gerrymanders 
altogether. 
The first option is wholly impractical. Federal courts would have an extremely 
difficult time testing for Congress-wide harms, because doing so would require courts to 
evaluate every state’s congressional redistricting plan simultaneously. Such an approach 
would be thwarted by a number of serious coordination problems both among courts and 
within the states that produce congressional redistricting plans. For these reasons, a shift 
towards risk-based regulation it is a more attractive option. Federal courts can, in theory, 
reduce the risk of Congress-wide injuries by intervening at the state level. But the 
possibility that courts can intervene state by state to police congressional partisan 
gerrymanders does not mean that decisions about justiciability and doctrinal structure can 
remain identical for state legislative and congressional redistricting. To the contrary, the 
disaggregated nature of congressional redistricting leads to unique justiciability questions 
                                                 
90 Note that I am arguing only that courts should approach congressional and state legislative partisan 
gerrymanders differently because the former present special problems for any effort to identify the 
existence of the relevant constitutional injury. There is, of course, another reason why it might be that 
courts should treat these two types of gerrymanders differently: one type might pose a greater constitutional 
danger than the other because of the different political contexts in which they occur. For example, it might 
be that courts should police state legislative redistricting more closely because it involves self-interested 
state legislators drawing their own districts, while congressional redistricting does not. As I have noted 
elsewhere, the perception that state legislative redistricting presents a more direct conflict of interest may 
explain in part why more states have stripped their legislatures of authority over state legislative 
redistricting than over congressional redistricting. See Cox, 79 NYU L Rev at 793 (cited in note 12). See 
also id (questioning whether this distinction makes much sense in the contemporary political climate, where 
there is evidence of strong national political party influence over state parties in the redistricting arena). But 
this different set of potential reasons for distinguishing between state legislative and congressional 
redistricting (which are also overlooked by the Court), are not the focus of this article. 
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and has important practical implications for how judicial review of congressional 
gerrymanders will have to differ from the review of state legislative gerrymanders. 
A. The Impracticality of Nationwide Review 
Federal courts probably cannot develop tests to identify directly the existence of 
congress-wide harms produced by congressional gerrymanders. Doing so would require 
either that many courts coordinate their review of redistricting plans, or that an individual 
court review every state’s redistricting plan simultaneously—neither of which is a 
particularly plausible option. 
Congressional partisan gerrymandering lawsuits have historically been framed as 
challenges to a single state’s redistricting plan.91 Unsurprisingly, courts in such litigation 
have focused only on the redistricting scheme before them.92 As the above discussion 
makes clear, however, if federal courts continue this practice they will be incapable of 
identifying the presence of any legislature-wide injuries produced by the decennial 
congressional redistricting process. That harm can be identified only by reference to the 
districting plans of all other states in addition to the state whose redistricting plan the 
court is evaluating. Under the current judicial practices for reviewing redistricting 
schemes, therefore, federal courts will not be capable of identifying the injuries that have 
been the primary focus of the partisan gerrymandering literature. 
Although partisan gerrymandering litigation is not currently structured to enable 
courts to evaluate legislature-wide injuries caused by congressional redistricting, this 
does not mean that such review is impossible. Courts could modify their review of 
partisan gerrymandering claims in an effort to identify such injuries. (Or, to put it from 
the perspective of litigation strategy, lawyers could reframe their partisan gerrymandering 
challenges.) In order to evaluate congressional redistricting plans for Congress-wide 
injuries, courts could do one of two things: First, one court could evaluate every state’s 
congressional redistricting plan simultaneously to determine whether the plans, in the 
aggregate, biased the composition of Congress, depressed competition, or caused some 
other injury to the structure of representation in Congress as a whole. Alternatively, 
multiple courts could coordinate their review of individual states’ redistricting plans in 
                                                 
91 See, for example, Martinez v Bush, 234 F Supp 2d 1275 (SD Fla 2002); Badham v Eu, 694 F Supp 
664 (1988). See also note 27. 
92 See, for example, cases cited in notes 27, 91. 
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some fashion that would permit each court to review only one state’s plan while ensuring 
that the conclusions drawn about each state’s plan were aggregated to determine whether 
the plans in combination caused an impermissible harm.93 
The second possibility seems extremely farfetched. There are currently no 
mechanisms that would facilitate that sort of complex coordination between Article III 
courts. The first possibility seems superficially more plausible, but in practice it would 
present substantial problems as well. The evidentiary complexity of the task itself might 
tax judicial competence. Under the conventional injury accounts, for example, a court 
would have to evaluate the redistricting plans from all fifty states in order to determine 
whether congressional redistricting around the country had introduced partisan bias or 
anticompetitive effects. 
Sheer complexity aside, simultaneously evaluating the congressional districts from 
every state poses its own set of coordination problems. The difficulty arises because 
different states’ congressional districting plans are not created at the same time and do 
not remain stable over time. Although states are required to redraw their congressional 
districts following the release of each census,94 states undertake the task of redistricting at 
somewhat different times.95 (At least one state—Maine—does not revise its district lines 
until more than two years after the census.)96 Moreover, the redistricting plans that states 
initially adopt are often challenged under the Voting Rights Act, the federal Constitution, 
                                                 
93 Note that review of congressional redistricting does not present the same kind of coordination 
problem that often arises when a decentralized judiciary regulates a national activity—or, to be more 
precise, any activity that extends across multiple judicial districts. There, the difficulty is caused by the 
disaggregated nature of judicial review and can be solved by consolidating judicial review in one body, 
either initially (as with statutory rules that force all legal challenges to certain statutes into the district court 
for the District of Columbia) or on appeal (as with the Judiciary Act’s rules of appellate jurisdiction that 
give the Supreme Court final say over most questions of federal law). With respect to congressional 
redistricting, however, the difficulty is caused by the disaggregated nature of the government action being 
reviewed, not by the disaggregated nature of the judicial system.  
94 See Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 489 n 2 (2003); Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 583–84 (1964). 
See also Cox, 79 NYU L Rev at 758 n 36, 801 (cited in note 12) (explaining that this requirement 
originated as a presumption and grew into an apparently prophylactic requirement). 
95 States ordinarily must redistrict in time to have a new districting plan in place for the first round of 
elections following the release of the Census. See Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 35–37 (1993). See also 
Cox, 79 NYU L Rev at 758 n 37, 778 n 102 (cited in note 12). 
96 Maine Const Art IV, pt 1, § 2 (“The Legislature which convenes in 1983 and every 10th year 
thereafter shall cause the State to be divided into districts for the choice of one Representative for each 
district.”); id Art IV, pt 2, § 2 (“The Legislature which shall convene in the year 1983 and every tenth year 
thereafter shall cause the State to be divided into districts for the choice of a Senator from each district, 
using the same method as provided in Article IV, Part First, Section 2 for apportionment of Representative 
Districts.”). 
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state law, or some combination of all three. The districts are thus often in flux, which 
would introduce substantial uncertainty into any attempt to evaluate every states’ 
congressional redistricting scheme simultaneously: at any point, one or more districting 
schemes could be either invalidated or revised, further complicating the efforts of a court 
to evaluate the state plans in the aggregate. And unfortunately, this difficulty cannot be 
avoided simply by delaying review of partisan gerrymandering claims until other legal 
challenges are resolved, because litigation over a state’s redistricting scheme has been 
known to stretch over the course of the entire decade.97 Solving this problem, therefore, 
would require radically revising the entire contemporary redistricting regulatory 
structure. 
Finally, either of the two above approaches poses an additional problem at the 
remedial stage of litigation. Even if one of the approaches made it possible for a court (or 
courts) to identify the existence of a legislature-wide harm caused by the partisan 
gerrymandering of congressional districts, there would remain the question of how to 
remedy that harm. Because each state’s redistricting plan would have contributed to the 
harm, it would be incoherent to conclude that only state X or Y was the cause of the 
injury and therefore that only state X or Y should have its redistricting plan invalidated. 
Joint causation precludes the possibility of easily assigning blame to any particular state. 
Relatedly, it would often be possible to remedy the harm in a number of different ways, 
each of which would require revising the districts in a different state or set of states.98 
Accordingly, there would be no obvious way to figure out which states’ plans to 
invalidate or revise at the remedial stage of litigation. And absent a theory about how to 
make this choice, the decision would be essentially arbitrary. 
B. Risk-based Regulation and State-Level Review 
While courts are unlikely to be able to simultaneously evaluate the effect of 
multiple congressional redistricting plans, this does not necessarily mean that Vieth’s 
justiciability holding was wrong and that courts should get out of the business of policing 
                                                 
97 See, for example, Hunt v Cromartie, 121 S Ct 1452 (2001). Moreover, there are additional reasons 
that delay might be disfavored. Perhaps most obviously, delay might mean that elections would be 
conducted under gerrymandered congressional redistricting maps that were later determined to cause an 
impermissible harm. 
98 Heather Gerken has identified a similar dilemma in the context of racial vote dilution litigation. See 
Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv L Rev 1663, 1700–02 (2001). 
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congressional partisan gerrymanders. The question remains whether courts can police the 
nationwide harms of congressional gerrymandering by intervening state by state. If this is 
possible, then the prescription that would follow from recognizing the disaggregated 
nature of congressional redistricting would be that the Court should shift its focus -- away 
from Vieth’s effort to develop a test for directly measuring the harms of congressional 
gerrymanders, and toward an approach that reduces the risk that individual states’ 
redistricting plans combine to produce cognizable harms. 
In theory, courts can reduce the risk of Congress-wide injuries through state-by-
state intervention. Whether they can do so in practice is another matter, precisely because 
of the differences between state legislative and congressional redistricting.99 First, 
whether intervention is worthwhile in the congressional context turns on questions that 
are irrelevant in the state context—such as whether the effects of congressional 
redistricting in each state tend to combine to produce nationwide harms or, instead, tend 
to cancel out. Perhaps more important, the disaggregated nature of congressional 
redistricting has implications for how judicial intervention should (and should not) be 
structured -- beyond the preliminary question whether judicial intervention is at all 
warranted. In particular, some doctrinal rules courts might use to police state legislative 
gerrymanders would not be effective at policing congressional gerrymanders and might 
even make matters worse. 
1. The theoretical possibility of risk-based regulation 
State-by-state judicial intervention can in theory reduce the possibility of the 
legislature-wide injuries described by the conventional accounts of partisan 
gerrymandering’s harms. Consider, for example, the partisan bias account of injury. As a 
theoretical matter, it is clear that judicial intervention at the state level could reduce the 
probability that a significant level of bias would accumulate across state plans (so long as 
judicial intervention actually had the effect of reducing partisan bias in congressional 
delegations). Imagine, for example, that without judicial intervention each state’s 
redistricting process produces some variable amount of state-level bias in favor of one 
party or another. There is some probability that these state-level biases will accumulate to 
                                                 
99 Given the extent to which the Supreme Court has struggled to supply a coherent partisan 
gerrymandering jurisprudence, setting judicial review of congressional gerrymanders on more solid footing 
would itself represent an important step forward. 
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produce an objectionable national level bias, rather than essentially canceling out. The 
greater the average amount of bias generated by each state, the greater the probability of 
getting an unacceptable level of national bias.100 
Thus, if courts could reduce the amount of bias in each state’s plan from some 
positive amount to zero, judicial intervention would essentially eliminate the possibility 
of impermissible national bias.101 Of course, producing this outcome would require 
perfect policing by courts—an unlikely scenario. Even absent perfect policing, however, 
judicial intervention can lower the likelihood that an unacceptable level of bias will 
accumulate.102 So long as courts reduce the level of bias in each state congressional plan 
in some relatively uniform fashion,103 they will decrease the probability that the state-
level biases will accumulate into an unacceptable level of national bias.104 
                                                 
100 This is because the higher levels of bias in each state will stretch out the distribution of bias across 
states. The fatter this distribution, the higher the statistical likelihood that aggregating across states will 
yield a high level of national bias. To see this more clearly, consider the skinny limiting case—where every 
state’s bias equals zero. In that case, there is no chance that the state-level biases will accumulate to 
produce a national-level bias. 
101 See note 100. 
102 For an example of a risk-based regulatory approach that should lower the likelihood of high levels 
of national bias, consider Cox, 79 NYU L Rev 751 (cited in note 12) (discussing a prohibition on states 
redistricting more than once per decennial redistricting cycle). 
103 The caveat “relatively uniform” is necessary because if courts differ dramatically in how effective 
they are at lowering bias in congressional delegations then it is not clear that judicial intervention in every 
state will lower the likelihood of partisan bias in Congress. To see this, take the extreme case in which only 
one or two courts were at all effective at policing bias in congressional delegations. “Successful” 
intervention in one or two states may be worse than no intervention at all. See text accompanying notes 
113–118. 
104 The same analysis holds for the anti-competition injury described in Part II. It might be tempting to 
argue that the analysis of anticompetitive effects should be different on the ground that such effects, by 
their nature, will only accumulate (rather than cancel out) across districts. After all, one might argue, the 
effects are anticompetitive—never pro-competitive. But such an argument engages in definitional sleight of 
hand. The fact that the literature does not talk about a baseline for competition in the same way that it does 
a baseline for partisan bias does not mean that there is no baseline; it just means that the baseline is 
unspecified. Accordingly, the aggregation of competition-based effects can in theory be modeled in the 
same way as bias effects, with some state plans favoring competition and some disfavoring it in the same 
way that some states plans favor Democrats while some disfavor them (by favoring Republicans). It may be 
true, of course, that no state plans favor competition—though more would need to be said about the 
appropriate competitiveness baseline in order to determine this. Even if this is true, however, the question 
remains whether the state-by-state effects accumulate to produce an objectionable Congress-wide 
anticompetitive effect. The distribution of state plans around the baseline will affect our predictions about 
the likelihood of this occurring (in the same way that our predictions about the possibility of bias 
accumulating would be different if we were told that the Democrats controlled the redistricting process in 
all fifty states), but the basic question remains the same. 
   
37 
2. The practice of risk-based regulation 
While courts can use state-by-state intervention to police congressional 
gerrymanders, this does not mean that partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence can 
continue to be the same for both state legislative and congressional redistricting. State-
by-state intervention to police congressional partisan gerrymanders will have to differ 
from intervention to police state legislative gerrymanders. 
First, whether judicial intervention is worthwhile in the congressional context turns 
on questions that are irrelevant in the state legislative context. Judicial intervention can in 
theory lower the probability that state redistricting schemes combine to produce 
Congress-wide injuries. But if that probability is low in the first place, judicial 
intervention becomes less appealing.105 Moreover, intervention is less attractive if state-
by-state intervention can only reduce that probability by a small amount. Without 
knowing anything about the likelihood that harm will accumulate or about the extent to 
which courts can reduce this likelihood, therefore, we cannot meaningfully evaluate the 
value of judicial intervention. 
Thus, the correctness of Vieth’s ultimate conclusion that courts should continue to 
police congressional partisan gerrymanders turns importantly on the answer to empirical 
questions—about how likely it is that injuries will aggregate substantially, and how likely 
it is that courts will improve the situation. These questions are under-explored. With 
respect to the partisan bias account, for example, the legal literature rarely asks whether 
state-by-state manipulation regularly leads to substantial levels of national partisan bias. 
While the political science literature has engaged the question a bit more directly, it is 
somewhat divided on the answer. For many years empirical work on this question 
reported “relatively moderate partisan effects state by state, which cumulate into even 
smaller net national effects.”106 More recent work, however, raises the possibility that 
state-by-state effects can aggregate to produce substantial national effects.107 
                                                 
105 There is, of course, always the problem of setting threshold above which system-wide bias should 
be considered substantial or unacceptable. But this difficulty is present whether one seeks to police partisan 
bias at the delegation- or Congress-wide level. Therefore, the debate about what degree of deviation from 
partisan symmetry the system should accept without intervention is orthogonal to the question of which 
institutional level is the appropriate one from which to evaluate partisan symmetry. 
106 See, for example, Cox and Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander at 21 (cited in note 60); accord id at 
21 (“The view now prevailing in the literature is that redistricting is unlikely to produce any net partisan 
gains at the national level . . . .”); Butler and Cain, Congressional Redistricting at 8 (cited in note 57) 
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The question of what courts should do in the face of this uncertainty—until better 
evidence is available—turns on a variety of institutional concerns that are well beyond 
the scope of this paper.108 The important point, however, is that these questions about the 
risk-based approach all bear on whether it is even worth regulating congressional partisan 
gerrymanders. But they are irrelevant to this threshold determination in the state 
legislative context. 
Beyond the question whether intervention is warranted, the disaggregated nature of 
congressional redistricting alters the type of state-level intervention that will be effective 
at policing congressional gerrymanders. Courts will not necessarily be able to apply 
identical doctrinal rules in the state legislative and congressional context, because some 
doctrinal rules that might work in the state legislative context simply will not work in the 
congressional context. An example of such a rule is the one that Justice Breyer proposed 
in Vieth. Breyer proposed that the Court invalidate redistricting plans that improperly 
enabled a minority of voters to capture a majority of the state’s seats.109 He selected this 
rule to preserve legislative majoritarianism.110 As I explained earlier, the rule does 
preserve legislative majoritarianism when it is applied to state legislative gerrymanders, 
but it does not directly protect that principle when it is applied to congressional 
gerrymanders.111 In the congressional context, the rule only directly ensures majority 
control of an individual congressional delegation. And while it is perhaps easy to think 
that applying this rule, state by state, to congressional redistricting would have the 
indirect effect of preserving legislative majoritarianism in Congress, it would not. 
Striking down congressional plans that allowed a minority of voters in the state to capture 
control of the delegation would not have the cumulative national effect of guarding 
                                                                                                                                                 
(noting that “the electoral system has little or no systematic partisan bias and that the net gains nationally 
from redistricting for one part over the other are very small”). 
107 See Cox and Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander at 51–54 (cited in note 58) (providing evidence 
that congressional redistricting produced a substantial pro-Republican bias in Congress before the 
reapportionment revolution in the 1960s). See also Hirsch, 2 Election L J at 190–195 (cited in note 33) 
(arguing that the last round of congressional redistricting argued produced a nationwide bias in favor of the 
Republicans of something like twenty-five seats). 
108 For an extended discussion of judicial decisionmaking in the context of uncertainty, see Adrian 
Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Account of Legal Interpretation (unpublished 
manuscript). 
109 See Vieth v Jubelirer, 124 S Ct 1769, 1825 (2004) (Breyer dissenting). See also text accompanying 
notes 37–42. 
110 See Vieth, 124 S Ct at 1825. See also text accompanying notes 37–42. 
111 See text accompanying note 42. 
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against the possibility that a minority of voters nationwide could control a majority of 
seats in Congress.112 If the Court were to adopt Breyer’s goal of preserving legislative 
majoritarianism, therefore, it should not attempt to advance that goal by applying 
Breyer’s rule in both contexts. 
There are, of course, some rules for state-level intervention that might work well in 
both the state legislative and congressional contexts.113 Even with respect to such rules, 
however, courts have to be attentive to an additional coordination problem in the 
congressional context that is not present in the state legislative context. The idea that 
state-by-state intervention can substitute in some cases for simultaneously assessing 
every state’s redistricting plan depends crucially on reviewing courts’ adopting the same 
rules for intervention and then applying those rules in roughly the same fashion. In other 
words, the possibility of risk-based regulation is contingent on the reviewing courts’ 
coordinating around a set of rules to apply when they review congressional 
redistricting.114 For federal courts this would require that myriad lower courts speak with 
a fairly uniform voice—which may be possible only on an overly optimistic view of 
federal courts.115 And in the absence of effective coordination, the nonuniform 
application of the rules in federal courts could make an otherwise attractive risk-based 
regulatory strategy ineffectual or counterproductive.116 
                                                 
112 An electoral minority can capture a majority of seats within a particular jurisdiction where two 
conditions obtain: the presence of partisan bias and the existence of a (relatively) closely divided electorate. 
In order to reduce the possibility of minority control in the congressional context, therefore, courts would 
need a rule that designed to lower the national level of partisan bias. But applying Breyer’s rule state by 
state would not do this. It would only strike down biased plans in states where the electorate was closely 
divided. Other states, however, might contain much larger levels of bias but be valid under his rule, either 
because the state was not closely divided or because the bias favors an electoral majority rather than the 
electoral minority. For example, a congressional redistricting plan in which partisan bias made it possible 
for a small electoral majority to capture essentially all of the seats in the state would be sustained under his 
proposed rule. 
113 As I mentioned above, a rule prohibiting redistricting more than once each decade might be such a 
rule. 
114 This is a different coordination problem than the one discussed in Part IV.A. That section was 
concerned with the difficulty courts would have coordinating their review of congressional redistricting in 
order to assess the combined effects of every state’s congressional redistricting scheme. If courts adopt a 
risk-based regulatory strategy they will not have to coordinate their review. But they will have to 
coordinate around a set of doctrinal rules. 
115 See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretation and the Fallacy of 
Division, J of Contemp Legal Issues (forthcoming 2005). 
116 This conclusion also highlights a potential cost of adopting the approach that Justice Kennedy 
appears to favor in Vieth. Kennedy expressed hope that greater lower court experimentation in partisan 
gerrymandering cases could help courts tease out workable rules for policing partisan gerrymanders. 
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In addition, this coordination problem highlights an overlooked shortcoming of one 
of the most popular post-Vieth reform proposals. Following the Supreme Court’s refusal 
in Vieth to police partisan gerrymandering more vigorously, a number of commentators 
have called on state courts to interpret their state constitutions to endorse more aggressive 
judicial oversight of partisan redistricting.117 These commentators have uniformly 
assumed that state court oversight is a good substitute for federal court intervention. But 
state courts may be inferior in the context of congressional redistricting. If the success of 
state-by-state intervention depends on there being a uniform, nationwide rule for such 
intervention, then the piecemeal adoption of congressional partisan gerrymandering 
doctrines by different state courts might be ineffective. (Such intervention might be 
ineffective either because it is adopted in only a limited number of states, or because 
different states adopt markedly different rules for intervention.) 
In fact, the decision by any given state court to read its state constitution to endorse 
broad oversight of congressional partisan gerrymanders could potentially even exacerbate 
the problem. If a state court in a large, predominantly Democratic state stepped in and 
disarmed the legislature’s capacity to engage in congressional partisan gerrymandering, 
that court might inadvertently facilitate pro-Republican bias if the courts in large 
Republican-dominated states chose not to interpret their state constitutions in the same 
fashion.118 Thus, the existing commentary on Vieth oversimplifies when it treats state 
court intervention as a simple fix for federal court impotence in congressional 
gerrymandering cases. 
                                                                                                                                                 
During this period of experimentation, the different strategies applied to congressional redistricting by 
isolated lower courts may well be ineffective—even if the strategy itself is sound—simply because strategy 
is applied only to a small number of redistricting plans. This does not mean that experimentation is 
unwarranted; the benefits of experimentation might be sufficient to justify the approach. It does suggest, 
however, that in the midterm this strategy may do little to lower the risk that congressional partisan 
gerrymanders combine to harm the structure of representation in Congress. 
117 See, for example, James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering 
Claims, 2 Election L J 643 (2004). 
118 This point also suggests that there could be some unanticipated costs to another popular idea for 
reform—the proposal that voters use states’ initiative processes to transfer authority to draw congressional 
district lines from legislatures to nonpartisan or bipartisan commissions. If such efforts were successful in 
only a few states (or if there were a consistent partisan alignment among the states most likely to enact such 
reforms by initiative), the use of commissions might exacerbate certain harms. In this vein, it is interesting 
to note that Arnold Schwarzenegger is reportedly eyeing the possibility of backing an initiative in 
California to give redistricting authority to a group of retired judges. See Peter Nicholas, Governor 
Considers a Special Election, LA Times A1 (Dec 2, 2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
Congressional political gerrymanders pose different analytic, normative, and 
constitutional questions than do state legislative gerrymanders. The latter implicate the 
composition of the whole legislative body, while the former affect only a part. This 
difference, generally overlooked by courts and commentators, reveals that the Supreme 
Court’s general approach in Vieth v. Jubelirer—of treating the case as a referendum on 
Davis v. Bandemer—is incomplete and misguided. 
In contrast to state legislative partisan gerrymanders, congressional partisan 
gerrymanders produce harms that are most plausibly located at the national, not the state 
or individual district level. This aspect of the harm complicates the judicial review of 
congressional partisan gerrymanders, introducing a different set of empirical questions 
that bear on whether intervention is worthwhile, and highlighting the importance of 
judicial coordination for any successful intervention. While these new complications are 
significant, my aim is not to suggest that they are intractable and counsel swift judicial 
retreat. Rather, my goal is to refocus the discussion about congressional partisan 
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